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an electrical power transmission grid that has been damaged by a natural disaster or 
terrorist attack.  The damage can be extensive and recovery can take weeks or months.  
An efficient recovery plan that maximizes the utilization of repair resources can help 
ensure swift restoration of services.   
The network recovery-planning model is implemented in GAMS (General 
Algebraic Modeling System) and uses CPLEX as the solver.  An electrical grid based on 
IEEE’s 300-bus transmission network is used for testing.  To simulate varying degrees of 
damage to the network, we choose up to 20% of the grid’s components to be placed out 
of service.  Based on the availability of repair resources and penalties for unserved 
demand, the model produces a repair schedule that minimizes the cost of power shed. 
We demonstrate that for a network with up to 8% of its components damaged, the 
model can produce an optimal recovery plan within 20 minutes on a 2 GHz personal 
computer.  For our largest test-case with 20% of network components damaged, the 
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This thesis formulates and solves a mixed-integer program (MIP) to plan the 
recovery of an electrical power transmission grid that has been damaged. 
Electrical power grids span large geographical areas and, consequently, are hard 
to protect against malicious activities; they are also vulnerable to natural disasters.  The 
formulation of a recovery plan after catastrophic and widespread damage to the power 
grid can be a complicated process.  The complexity can be exacerbated by pressure on 
planning staff to produce a plan quickly.  Decisions on which parts of the grid to repair in 
what order must be made while considering the availability of repair resources and 
spares, and the relative importance of customers affected by the service disruption.     
We develop a MIP called RECovery OPtimization (RECOP) to aid in the 
recovery-planning process.  RECOP accounts for the availability of repair resources and 
spares for damaged grid components, and schedules their allocation in order to obtain a 
recovery schedule that minimizes the economic cost of unmet demand for energy.  If 
necessary, precedence relationships enforcing the relative orders in which components 
need to be repaired can be defined as part of the inputs to RECOP.  These relationships 
can be used to reflect a requirement to restore certain sectors of the network first. 
We implement RECOP in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and 
use CPLEX as the solver.  An electrical grid based on IEEE’s 300-bus transmission 
network is used for testing.  To simulate varying degrees of damage to the network, we 
choose up to 20% of the grid’s buses, lines and transformers to be placed out of service.  
We demonstrate that for a network with up to 8% of its components damaged, the model 
can produce an optimal recovery plan within 20 minutes on a 2 GHz personal computer.  
For our largest test-case with 20% of network components damaged, the recovery plan is 
within 7% of optimal after 1 hour of solver time. 
We also explore the use of Benders decomposition to solve RECOP, and the use 
of a heuristic to solve RECOP, at least approximately.  In all our test cases, Benders 
decomposition takes at least as much time as the MIP requires to produce a solution of 
 xiii
the same or inferior quality.  For the terrorist-attack scenarios, where relatively few 
components are damaged, the heuristic solutions are up to 40% worse in terms of energy 
shed compared to the MIP solutions.  The difference in performance between the two 
solution methods narrows in hurricane-damage scenarios, however, where more 
components are damaged.  In these cases, each heuristic solution obtained in ten seconds 
is within 10% of the solution obtained by solving the MIP directly for an hour.  This 
shows the potential of the heuristic solution method for larger-sized problems to obtain 
“reasonable” solutions within a short period of time. 
We demonstrate that, although the number of components of an electrical grid 
that is damaged during a coordinated terrorist attack may be relatively small compared to 
the number damaged during a hurricane, the impact in terms of energy shed and 
economic costs could be larger.  This is because terrorists can selectively target critical 
components that cannot be replaced immediately due to delivery and manufacturing lead-
times for replacement parts.  This highlights the potential impact of spares availability on 
grid recovery and underscores the need to keep a strategic inventory of critical 
components to facilitate quick restoration of the power grid.  To this end, RECOP can be 
used as a tool to help evaluate the effectiveness of various mixes of inventories. 
 xiv
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
This thesis formulates and solves a mixed-integer program (MIP) to plan the 
recovery of an electrical power transmission grid that has been damaged by a natural 
disaster or terrorist attack.  The recovery plan takes into account the scarcity of repair 
resources and spares, and schedules their allocation in order to minimize the economic 
cost due to unmet energy demand.  Alternative solution methods using heuristics and 
decomposition are also presented.  
Infrastructure networks, e.g., road, electricity and telecommunications networks, 
inherently span large geographical areas.  Consequently, they are hard to protect and can 
be vulnerable to natural disasters, e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes, and to man-made 
attacks, e.g., terrorist attacks and war.  One way to reduce a network’s vulnerability is to 
harden critical components.  Salmeron et al. [2004] develop bilevel mathematical models 
that can be used to identify critical sets of a power grid’s components, such as generators, 
transmission lines and transformers; these components become prime candidates for 
hardening. 
However, if a power grid has already been damaged, this question arises: How 
should repair be carried out to minimize disruption of services to customers?  The 
benefits of an efficient recovery process for the electric power grid cannot be over-stated 
due to the dependency of other industries on electrical power.  The then-chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, commented in November 2005 about the effects 
of Hurricane Katrina: “The combination of flooding, wind damage, and a lack of electric 
power also forced many crude oil refineries and natural gas processing plants to shut 
down”  [Federal Reserve Board 2005]. A quick recovery from a blackout can minimize 
the impact on the public and the economy. 
Power-grid recovery planning is a process that involves power-system modeling 
and “strategy planning.”  Power-system modeling ensures that the proposed recovery 
process does not inadvertently throw the system back into collapse due to unusual system 
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conditions and phenomena.  This thesis focuses on strategy-planning, which guides the 
formulation of a recovery process in order to meet a given objective.  Examples of such 
objectives include minimizing the total amount of energy shed, minimizing the duration 
of the restoration process or “priority restoration” of critical customers such as those 
belonging to the health- and public-services sectors.   
The formulation of a recovery plan after catastrophic and widespread damage to 
an electrical power grid is a complicated process.  The complexity can be exacerbated by 
pressure on planning staff to produce a plan quickly.  Decisions on the order in which 
repairs must be made have to take into account the repair-equipment and manpower 
resources available and the objective of the restoration.  This is a dynamic problem as 
repair crews can move in from unaffected areas to help in the recovery work, or move out 
in response to greater needs elsewhere.   
An optimization-based decision-support system can help in scheduling the 
recovery plan.  It can schedule repairs in order to minimize power-shedding over time, 
thereby limiting the impact of damage to the transmission grid on the grid’s customers.  It 
can also be used in a dynamic environment to track repairs and resources, and to 
reschedule them as new information becomes available.   
Non-trivial, real-world scenarios exist where such a tool may prove useful.  For 
example, Hurricane Charley caused the Florida Power and Light Company to mobilize 
11,200 workers and replace over 5,100 low-voltage transformers and 900 miles of wire 
[Florida Power and Light Company 2004.]  More recently, Hurricane Rita knocked out 
82% and 38% of transmission lines in southeastern Texas and southwestern Louisiana, 
respectively [Entergy Corporation 2005.]  Admittedly, these real-world problems are 
large in comparison with the 300-bus transmission network [IEEE 1993] used for testing 
our model.  However, we show that our methods do solve problems defined on this 300-
bus network in a reasonable amount of time:  Thus, they provide a starting point for 
research into solving larger problems. 
In contrast to storm damage, a coordinated terrorist attack on an electrical grid 
may see more limited damage that may, nonetheless, be highly disruptive if the terrorists 
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can identify and destroy critical components.  Such components may include high-
voltage transformers for which utilities usually keep few or no spares, because of their  
high cost and nominally high reliability.  Long delivery or manufacturing lead times for 
these components, which may stretch over weeks or months, exacerbates the potential for 
disruption.  Even if a national strategic inventory of critical, components having long 
replacement lead times is established [Electric Power Research Institute 2003], a shortage 
or delay in the delivery of replacement components cannot be ruled out.  Under this 
scenario, our recovery optimization model can help to determine which facilities to repair 
first while awaiting delivery of additional spares necessary for full network recovery. 
The model is intended as a high-level, low-resolution recovery-planning tool.  It is 
not designed to produce detailed, hourly schedules for each individual resource or piece 
of equipment involved in the recovery exercise.  Rather, the model prioritizes the repair 
of damaged components to ensure quick recovery while ensuring that resources are 
available to carry out the repair. 
Existing literature on infrastructure network recovery planning is limited.  Feng 
and Wang [2003] describe an integer-programming model for scheduling the emergency 
repair of highways damaged by an earthquake given that repairs are constrained by time 
and resources.  The model focuses on “reachability” for rescue within the first three days 
after an earthquake occurs.  It also considers the minimization of the risk from after-
shocks on work-crews by the appropriate choice of a minimum-risk path.  No network 
flow-balance or road-capacity constraints are considered.  Barbarosoglu and Arda [2004] 
formulate a multi-commodity, multi-modal time-space network model to optimize the 
routing and scheduling of emergency-response vehicles in disaster-affected areas.  While 
this model considers the traffic-handling capacity of an area’s roads, it does not deal with 
the scheduling of the repair of these roads.  Brown and Vassiliou [1993] introduce a 
decision-support system which uses optimization methods, simulation, and the decision-
maker’s judgment to assign tasks and resources for the repair of public works damaged 
by an earthquake.  Only a simple, pure assignment model is used by that system.   
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B. THESIS OUTLINE 
Subsequent chapters in this thesis are organized as follows: Chapter II describes 
the mathematical formulation of the network recovery planning model.  Chapter III 
reports results of the model applied to the IEEE 300-bus transmission network.  Attempts 
to speed up solution times using heuristics and Benders decomposition are also described.  
Section IV provides conclusions and points out areas for future research.  Appendix A 
describes the changes made to the IEEE transmission-network’s generation capacity to 
adapt it for our application.  Appendices B and C present the data used in our hurricane-
damage and terrorist-attack scenarios, respectively.  Finally, Appendix D presents the 
algorithm used to implement the Benders decomposition of RECOP.    
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II. A MODEL FOR THE OPTIMIZED RECOVERY OF 
DAMAGED ELECTRICAL GRIDS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter introduces the RECOP  model (RECovery OPtimization) developed 
to optimize recovery of a damaged electrical power grid.  The model starts with the 
premise that some of the power grid’s components, e.g., buses, transmission lines, 
transformers, are damaged, resulting in power-shedding at various parts of the network.  
The objective of the model is to formulate a recovery plan that minimizes the monetary 
opportunity cost arising from this unmet demand over the repair-time horizon.   
The rate of network recovery depends on the number of grid components that are 
damaged and the size of the available pool of various types of repair resources and 
replacement components.  Each type of repair resource may be viewed as a type of work 
team, defined by characteristics such as the number and capability of the team’s workers, 
and the tools and machinery available to them.  Each unit of a repair resource is therefore 
a re-useable asset that can be deployed repeatedly to repair damaged components.  
Replacement components are spare parts which, by their nature, can be used only once.  
(These are typically critical components such as high-voltage transformers, which may 
have long replacement lead-times.)  
The recovery process is very dynamic; the “health” of the grid progressively 
improves as more components are repaired, and the availability of repair resources and 
replacement parts can change over time.  As such, the model’s repair-time horizon is sub-
divided into a series of discrete time periods.  Repairs start at the beginning of a time 
period with a corresponding draw-down of applicable repair resources and replacement 
components.  Each repair is assumed to take an integral number of time periods after 
which the repair resources are released for further repairs.    
The number of time periods and their duration are scenario-dependent.  For 
example, a model dealing with the scheduling of work-crew for the repair of downed 
transmission lines may use 12-hour time-periods with a total of 28 periods to reflect a 
planning horizon of two weeks. 
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If necessary, precedence relationships enforcing the relative orders in which 
components need to be repaired can be defined as part of the inputs to the model.  Such 
relationships can be used to reflect a requirement to restore certain sectors of the network 
first.  This is the case, for example, when a sector supports other critical infrastructure 
such as public-health and sanitation services, or when damage to road infrastructure 
forces work-crews to concentrate their initial repair efforts on accessible parts of the 
network. 
The model output consists of a repair schedule by component and time period, 
resource utilization (parts and manpower), and the power flow and power shed in the grid 
at each stage of the recovery process.  
B. RECOVERY OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
RECOP is a linear MIP.  Its core consists of a power-flow model that 
approximates the non-linear behavior of active power flows in a power grid.  This 
approximation is adequate for a high-level, low-resolution model such as ours [Wood and 
Wollenberg 1996, p. 419.]  For simplicity, we suppose that all loads are held constant 
over time:  The model could be extended to incorporate load-duration curves through the 
introduction of partitioned time periods with distinct loads, but this is not explored here.  
Other parts of the RECOP model implement features described in Section A above.  
Additional modeling assumptions are discussed in Section C.  The RECOP model 
follows: 
Indices and Index Sets: 
C   set of customer classes, ∈c C  
T   set of time periods,  {1,2,... | |}t T T∈ =     
N   set of buses ,i j N∈  
N N′ ⊂  subset of buses that are damaged 
N N′′ ′⊂  subset of buses that are damaged and need spares for repair 
dN N⊂  subset of buses that have a local load 
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sN N⊂  subset of buses that have a local generation capability 
A N N⊂ ×      set of lines (this set includes transformers, which are modeled as 
lines in RECOP.) 
A A′ ⊂  subset of lines that are damaged 
A A′′ ′⊂  subset of lines that are damaged and need spares for repair 
R   set of repair resources, r ∈ R 
R′   set of spares, r R′ ′∈  
iR R′ ′⊂  set of spares needed to repair bus i N ′′∈  
,i jR R′ ′⊂  set of spares needed to repair line ,i j A′′∈  
AAP A A′ ′⊂ ×  pairs of damaged lines [( , ), ( , )]i j i j′ ′  where line ( , )i j  must be repaired 
before starting repair on line ( , )i j′ ′  
ANP A N′ ′⊂ ×  pairs of damaged lines and buses [( , ), )]i j i′  where line ( , )i j  must be 
repaired before starting repair on bus i' 
NAP N A′ ′⊂ ×  pairs of damaged buses and lines [ , ( , )]i i j′ ′  where bus i must be 
repaired before starting repair on line ( , )i j′ ′  
NNP N N′ ′⊂ ×  pairs of damaged buses [ , ]i i′  where bus i must be repaired before 
starting repair on bus i' 
Parameters and “(units)”, if applicable: 
h  duration (hours) of each time period t 
ρ  weight ($) for penalizing the objective function value if damaged 
buses or lines are not repaired 
,r tr∆  change in the quantity of type r repair resource available at the 
beginning of time t 
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,r tr ′∆  change in the quantity of type r' replacement component available 
at the beginning of time t 
,i cd  load at bus 















i jI  
1 if  and ( , ) ,
0 otherwise
i N i j A′∈ ∈  
,
j
i jI  
1 if  and ( , ) ,
0 otherwise
j N i j A′∈ ∈  
,i jI  
1 if ( , ) ,
0 otherwise
i j A′∈  
,i ju  transmission capacity for line ( , )i j A∈  (MW) 
, , , ,
n
i j t t rv ′  for bus i N ′∈  where ( , )i j A∈ , , , , ,
n
i j t t rv ′  equals ,i ju  if repair that 
started on the bus during time period t' has been completed by 
period t (MW),   t t′ ≤ .  , , , ,
n
i j t t rv ′  equals zero if bus i N ′∈ is awaiting 
or under repair.  Similarly for bus j N ′∈ , where ( , )i j A∈ . 
, , , ,i j t t rv ′  for line ( , )i j A′∈ , , , , ,i j t t rv ′  equals ,i ju  during time period t if repair 
that started on the line during period t' has been completed by time 
t (MW),  t t′ ≤ . 
, , ,
n
i t t rf ′  for bus i N ′∈ , , , ,
n
i t t rf ′  equals the number of units of type r resource 
used to repair the bus during time period t if the repair effort 
started during period t',  t t′ ≤ . 
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, , , ,i j t t rf ′  for line ( , )i j A′∈ , , , , ,i j t t rf ′  equals the number of units of type r 
resource used to repair the line during time period t if the repair 
effort started during period t',  t t′ ≤ . 
,
n
i rτ  for bus i N ′∈ , ,
n
i rτ  equals the number of time periods required to 
repair the bus using repair resource r R∈  
, ,i j rτ  for line ( , )i j A′∈ , , ,i j rτ  equals the number of time periods required 
to repair the line using repair resource r R∈  
,
n
i rλ ′  for bus i N ′′∈ , ,ni rλ ′  equals the number of units of type r' spare 
needed to repair the bus, ir R′ ′∈  
, ,i j rλ ′  for line ( , )i j A′′∈ , , ,i j rλ ′  equals the number of units of type r' spare 
needed to repair the line, ,i jr R′ ′∈  
n
it  earliest time period to start repair on damaged bus i N ′∈  
,i jt  earliest time period to start repair on damaged line ( , )i j A′∈  
, ,i c tp
−  unit cost of energy shed at node si N∈ incurred by customer of 
class c C∈ during time period t ($/MWh) 









where ,i jσ  and ,i jϕ  are the per unit reactance and resistance of line 
( , )i j A∈ , respectively 
g
iu  generation capacity at bus 
si N∈ (MW) 
M defining P  and B  as the maximum line-capacity and line-
susceptance, respectively, and 3.142π =  radians, then 
M P Bπ= +   
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Decision variables and “(units)”, where applicable: 
yi,j,t  power flow from bus i to bus j during time period t (MW) 
, ,
n
i t rx  
1 if repair on bus  starts during time period  using resouce ,
0 otherwise
i N t r R′∈ ∈
 
, , ,i j t rx  
1 if repair on line ( , )  starts during time period  using resource 
,
0 otherwise







i tq  







, ,i j tq  







, ,i c ts
−  load shed at bus di N∈  by customer of class c C∈ during time 
period t (MW) 
,i tg  power generation at bus 
si N∈ during time period t (MW) 
,i tθ  phase angle at bus i N∈  during time period t (radians)  
Formulation:  (Remark: All units above are converted into per-unit values for a 
base load of 100 MW.) 
RECOP: , , , , , , ,
( , )
min
| | | |d
n
i c t i c t i t i j t
c C t T i N t T i j A t Ti N




′ ′∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈∈
− −∑∑∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑x,q,y,s,θ,g    (1) 
s.t.  
Power-flow balance: 
, , , , , , , ,
( , ) ( , )
,d gj i t i j t i i c t i i t i c
j i A i j A c C c C
y y I s I g d i N t T−
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− + + = ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (2)  
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Phase-angle constraints: 
{ }, , , , , , , , , , , ,( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )i n j ni j t i j i t j t i j i t i j j t i j i j ty B M I q I q I qθ θ− − ≤ − + − + −    
       ( , ) ,i j A t T∀ ∈ ∈  (3)  
{ }, , , , , , , , , , , ,( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )i n j ni j t i j i t j t i j i t i j j t i j i j ty B M I q I q I qθ θ− − ≥ − − + − + −   
         ( , ) ,i j A t T∀ ∈ ∈  (4)  
Capacity of damaged arcs:  
 , , , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) ,i j t i j t t r i j t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑        (5) 
, , , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) ,i j t i j t t r i j t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑     (6) 
Capacity of arcs whose origin nodes i have been damaged: 
, , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) , ,n ni j t i j t t r i t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A i N t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈∑ ∑      (7) 
, , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) , ,n ni j t i j t t r i t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A i N t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈∑ ∑    (8) 
Capacity of arcs whose destination nodes j have been damaged: 
, , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) , ,n ni j t i j t t r j t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A j N t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈∑ ∑     (9) 
, , , , , , , ,
|
( , ) , ,n ni j t i j t t r j t r
t T t t r R
y v x i j A j N t T
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈
′≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈∑ ∑    (10) 
Capacity of undamaged arcs:  
, , , , ( , ) \ ,i j i j t i ju y u i j A A t T′− ≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈      (11) 
Maximum generating-unit output if connecting buses are undamaged: 
,0 ( \ '),
g s
i t ig u i N N N t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∈      (12) 
Maximum generating-unit output if connecting buses are damaged: 
, ,0 ( ),
g n s
i t i i tg u q i N N t T′≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∈      (13)  
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Force binary variables ,
n
i tq  and , ,i j tq to be zero if damaged buses and lines, 








i t i t r
r Rt T t t
q x i N t T
τ
′
∈′ ′∈ ≤ −
′= ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑       (14)  
, ,
, , , , ,
|
( , ) ,
i j r
i j t i j t r
t T t t r R
q x i j A t T
τ
′
′ ′∈ ≤ − ∈
′= ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑      (15) 
Repair-resource constraints: 
, , , , , , , , , , , , ,
( , ) | | |
,n ni j t t r i j t r i t t r i t r r t
i j A t T t t i N t T t t t T t t
f x f x r r R t T
′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′∈ ∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ≤ ∈ ≤
+ ≤ ∆ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (16) 
Spare constraints: 
,
, , , . , , , , ,




i j r i j t r i r i t r r t
i j A r R t T t t r R i N r R t T t t r R t T t t
x x r r R t Tλ λ
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′∈ ∈ ∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ≤
′ ′+ ≤ ∆ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
           (17) 
Repair line ( , )i j  before line ( , )i j′ ′ : 
, ,
, , , , , ,
| | ( )
[( , ), ( , )] ,
i j r
AA
i j t r i j t r
t T t t r R r R t T t t
x x i j i j P t T
τ
′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ≤ −
′ ′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (18) 
Repair line ( , )i j  before bus i':
 
, ,
, , , , ,
| | ( )
[( , ), ] ,
i j r
n AN
i t r i j t r
t T t t r R r R t T t t
x x i j i P t T
τ
′ ′ ′
′ ′ ′ ′∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ∈ ≤ −
′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (19) 
Repair bus i before line ( , )i j′ ′ : 
,
, , ', , ,
| | ( )




i j t r i t r
t T t t r R r R t T t t
x x i i j P t T
τ
′ ′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ′ ′∈ ≤ −
′ ′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑    (20) 
Repair bus i before bus i': 
,
, , , ,
| | ( )




i t r i t r
t T t t r R r R t T t t
x x i i P t T
τ
′ ′
′ ′∈ ≤ ∈ ∈ ′ ′∈ ≤ −
′≤ ∀ ∈ ∈∑ ∑ ∑ ∑      (21) 
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t T r R
x i N
∈ ∈
′≤ ∀ ∈∑∑        (22) 
, , , 1 ( , )i j t r
t T r R
x i j A
∈ ∈
′≤ ∀ ∈∑∑        (23) 
Earliest time period to start repair of damaged buses and lines respectively: 
, , 0 , , |
n n
i t r ix i N r R t T t t′= ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ <       (24) 
, , , ,0 ( , ) , , |i j t r i jx i j A r R t T t t′= ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ <      (25) 
Power shed must not exceed demand: 
, , ,0 , ,
d
i c t i cs d i N c C t T
−≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈      (26) 
Binary variables: 
, , {0,1} , ,
n
i t rx i N r R t T′∈ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈       (27) 
, , , {0,1} ( , ) , ,i j t rx i j A r R t T′∈ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈      (28) 
, {0,1} ,
n
i tq i N t T′∈ ∀ ∈ ∈        (29) 
, , {0,1} ( , ) ,i j tq i j A t T′∈ ∀ ∈ ∈       (30) 
 
C. MODELING ASSUMPTIONS AND COMMENTS 
1. Optimal Dispatch of Power 
 The RECOP power-flow model approximates an optimal dispatch of power 
through the electrical grid during each time period, i.e., the dispatch that a system 
operator would make given complete data on the state of repair in the network.  
2. Objective Function 
We suppose that power-shedding costs are much higher than generation costs and 
have therefore ignored generation costs in the objective function. 
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Most power grids have some level of redundancy meaning that during the normal 
operation of the grid, a few downed components may not lead to power-shedding.  To 
ensure that all damaged buses and lines are repaired even if their restoration to service 
has no impact on the amount of power shed, we include the following penalty terms in 
the objective function:    
, , ,
( , )| | | |
n
i t i j t




′ ′∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− −∑∑ ∑ ∑
 
3. Admittance Constraints  
Admittance (phase-angle) constraints should only be enforced for closed lines 
(i.e., lines connected to the system), which mandates that the lines and their associated 
end-buses are in working condition.  These requirements are implemented by constraints 
(3) and (4).  Lines that are working have the right-hand-side of constraints (3) and (4) set 
to zero.  If a line or either of its two end-buses are damaged and have yet to be repaired, 
the upper and lower bound limits on (3) and (4) effectively drop the phase-angle 
constraints. 
4. Power-Shedding  
The power-flow model assumes that power-shedding ( , ,i c ts
− ) can range from 0 
MW to the nominal demand for power, i.e., there is no restriction on the minimum viable 
supply to a load.  We assume that this could be achieved by implementing selective or 
rolling-blackouts to the individual classes of customers that comprise the load, so that 
power-flow balance is always maintained in the grid. 
5. Repair-Resource and Spares 
Travel times for repair-resources (e.g., work crew) between repair locations are 
ignored, i.e., when repairs on a grid component are completed at the end of a time period, 
the associated repair resources are immediately available at the beginning of the next 
time period for the repair of any component.  Similarly, transportation times for spares to 
reach their intended destinations are assumed to be zero.  However, since transportation 
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of some components (such as large-sized high-voltage transformers) can take a long time, 
we assume this effect is accounted for in the delivery lead-time of these components. 
6. Bus, Line and Transformer Capacity during Repair 
Buses and lines that are damaged or under repair have zero capacity.  They revert 
to their nominal capacities at the beginning of the time period immediately following the 
time period during which repairs are completed.   
All lines that are connected to a damaged bus have zero power flow through them 
until the bus has been repaired.   
D. IEEE 300-BUS TEST NETWORK DATA 
This section describes the assumptions and modifications necessary to adapt the 
IEEE 300-bus network data for testing RECOP.   
1. Network Generation Capacity 
The total load (which is assumed to be constant over time) in the original IEEE 
test network exceeds generation capacity by 46 MW.  To present a more realistic test case 
for RECOP, additional generation capacities are added to the system so that total 
generation capacity exceeds total load by 15%; the changes to the generation capacities 
are listed in Appendix A.  Total load and generation capacity are therefore 23.8 GW and 
27.4 GW, respectively. 
2. Line and Transformer Capacities  
As line and transformer capacities are not available in the IEEE data-set, 
estimates are obtained based on the following procedure: 
1. Estimate line or transformer capacity from Table 1 based on bus voltages 
2. Increase IEEE line or transformer IEEE power-flow solution values (provided 
by IEEE dataset with all components intact) by 20% 
3. Assume the higher of (1) and (2) to be the rated capacity of the line or 
transformer. 
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Bus voltage  
(kV) 
Estimated line capacity 
(MW) 
Estimated transformer 
capacity (MW)  
[use high-voltage bus] 
6.6 10 10 
 13.8 10 10 
20.0 10 10 
66.0 50 50 
115.0 150 150 
138.0 200 200 
230.0 500 500 
345.0 1,000 1,000 
Table 1. Estimated transformer and line capacities based on bus voltages. 
E. RECOP OUTPUT   
To illustrate the typical output from RECOP, we assume a hypothetical scenario 
in which five buses and five lines of the 300-bus test network are damaged.  Two of these 
damaged lines require a spare for repair, which we call “HVT.”  We suppose that no 
HVT is kept in inventory and that one unit can be delivered during the fifth time-period 
while a second unit can be delivered during the seventh.  Each time-period lasts a day.  
Work-crews of types r1, r2 and r3 are available to carry out the repair work.  These 
crews work in shifts and one team of r1 and r2 and two teams of r3 are available at any 
time during a 24-hour time-period.  Figures 1 and 2 display results. 
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Time period (day) Damaged 
component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bus 37 r2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Bus 41  r2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Bus 44   r2 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Bus 51    r2 9 9 9 9 9 
Bus 92 r3 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Line (3, 4)       r3 + HVT 9 
Line (41, 49)    r1 9 9 9 
Line (42, 46) r1 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Line (45, 46)     r3 + HVT 9 9 9 
Line (61,62)     r2 9 9 9 9 
Figure 1.   Optimal repair schedule for hypothetical scenario.  Cells with a diagonal line 
indicate components are awaiting repair.  Labels r1, r2 and r3 indicate the 
type of work-crew used to repair the damaged component.  Label HVT shows 
the usage of consumable spare HVT.  Cells with a check indicate that repairs 
have been completed on the component.  For example, repair of damaged line 
(45, 46) starts during time-period five utilizing work-crew r3.  It lasts for two 
time-periods and uses one unit of HVT. 
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Figure 2.   Chart showing the reduction in power-shedding as repair progresses with 
time.  Note that the power shed drops to zero before repair completion due to 
excess capacity in the network. 
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III. RESULTS  
A. OVERVIEW 
We test RECOP on two scenarios that are both based on the IEEE 300-bus test 
network described previously.   
The first scenario simulates relatively large-scale damage to the electrical grid 
caused by a storm or hurricane.  Damage is assumed to be confined to exposed and 
vulnerable parts of the grid such as transmission towers and lines.  We suppose that 
components and cables for the repair of damaged equipment are in adequate supply and 
do not place a constraint on the rate of the recovery process.  Instead, scheduling of repair 
resources such as work-crew and repair machinery, while maintaining repair-precedence 
relationships, shall be the main focus.   
The second scenario depicts a coordinated terrorist attack on the power grid.  
While the physical damage is likely to be less extensive than that caused by a storm, the 
impact can be larger as the terrorists can selectively destroy critical targets.  These can 
include system components such as high-voltage transformers with long replacement 
lead-times.  If the number of such destroyed components exceeds the number of available 
spares, a decision would have to be made regarding which parts of the grid are to be 
repaired first while waiting for the shortfall to be filled.   In this scenario, we investigate 
the use of our model as a tool for repair-resource scheduling and repair prioritization 
when demand for replacement parts exceeds availability. 
The objective of RECOP is to minimize the total cost of power shed over the 
recovery-time horizon, but determining the cost per kilowatt-hour of unserved demand 
for each of the loads on the grid is a complex matter:  The cost varies by customer class 
type (commercial, industrial, residential etc), season, duration of outage and other factors.  
For the purpose of this thesis, we assume, for simplicity, an outage cost of $7,500/MWh 
for all loads.  This outage cost is based on a report by ICF Consulting [2003] on the 
economic cost of the Northeastern blackout of August 2003.   
 20
The model is implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS) [2004] and solved with CPLEX 9.0 [2005.]  Tests are carried out on a 2 GHz 
personal computer having 1 GB of RAM and running under the Microsoft Windows 2000 
Professional operating system.   
B. SCENARIO 1: HURRICANE DAMAGE 
Utilities in hurricane-prone areas are usually well-equipped to deal with storm-
induced damage, and recovery is often relatively swift.  For example, Entergy 
Corporation [2005] was able to restore power to over three quarters of their customers 
affected by Hurricane Rita within two weeks.  For our modest-sized test case, we suppose 
a recovery-time horizon of up to 15 days with each time period lasting one day.   
To examine the impact of storms having varying severity, we randomly select 4% 
to 20% of the grid’s buses and lines to be downed.  Generators are assumed to be well-
protected and cannot be damaged although they can be disconnected from the grid if their 
associated buses are damaged.    
For network restoration, we suppose that the utility has a set of repair resources of 
types r1, r2 and r3, each with different repair capabilities and availability that may 
change over time.  We assume that each damaged component requires one to three units 
of any one type of resource for repair, and randomly assign a repair time of one to three 
days.  Appendix B contains detailed lists of the damaged components, the resource 
availability over time, and also the time and the number of resource units required to 
repair each damaged component.  Precedence relationships are also described.   
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All cases are configured in GAMS to solve until a relative optimality gap  of 1% 
or less is achieved [GAMS/CPLEX 2003], or until the solver time reaches one hour, 

















4% (28) 1.0 2,713 174 1.3 8 
8% (57) 1.0 4,912 418 3.1 9 
12% (85) 1.8 6,998 670 5.0 9 
16% (114) 3.7 9,788 999 7.5 11 
20% (141) 7.0 11,937 1,376 10.3 12 
Table 2. Impact of five different levels of damage on the grid due to a hurricane.  
“Percentage damaged” indicates the proportion of buses and lines in the grid 
that are damaged; the numbers in parentheses indicate the actual number of 
damaged components.  Maximum power shed indicates load shedding 
immediately after the hurricane and assumes that the undamaged portion of 
the grid is stabilized and operational.  Energy shed measures cumulative load 
lost until system repair is complete. 
C. SCENARIO 2: TERRORIST ATTACK 
We depict a coordinated terrorist attack on the power grid in this scenario.  One of 
the easiest terrorist targets could be high-tension transmission towers and lines in remote 
areas.  However, utilities regularly deal with damage to such infrastructure resulting from 
weather or malicious activities, and repairs can usually be accomplished quickly.   We 
therefore suppose a smart enemy that will choose to target other, more critical 
components of the network in order to create more extensive disruptions.  Some of these 
targets may include critical equipment with limited spares and long delivery lead-times.  
The Congressional Research Service [2004] wrote:  
Of the transmission system’s physical infrastructure, high-voltage (HV) 
transformers are arguably the most critical component. Utilities rarely 
experience loss of an individual HV transformer, but recovery from such a 
loss takes months if no spare is available. 
We therefore suppose a scenario in which the terrorists concentrate their attacks 
on high-voltage transformers and buses, and that the terrorists try to maximize the 
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disruption that they can cause by “shortlisting” as potential targets only those 
transformers with at least 400 MW of capacity, and buses with local generation capacity 
or loads.  We assume that up to 20 randomly chosen buses or transformers from the 
terrorists’ shortlist are damaged during a coordinated attack, and that each damaged bus 
or transformer requires one unit of replacement part, named s1 and s2, for repair (or 
replacement), respectively.  A limited number of s1 and s2 parts are kept as spares and 
are available for immediate use, but once these are consumed obtaining additional units 
incurs delivery or manufacturing lead time.  The availability of these parts over time is 
summarized in Table 3.  Appendix C contains detailed lists of the damaged components, 
the resource availability over time, and the time and resources required to repair each 
damaged component. 
Units of components delivered at the start of each week 
Component Units in inventory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
s1 2 0 0 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 
s2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 
Table 3. Number of spare parts in inventory and the number of additional units that 
can be delivered over time. 
We assume that repairs to a high-voltage transformer take four weeks once parts 
become available.  This is loosely based on data provided by IEEE [1996], which states a 
repair time of 768 hours.  For buses, we suppose that repairs will take two weeks.  
Finally, we assume that repair resources such as work-crew and machinery are available 
in abundance and do not place a constraint on the rate of recovery.  This is reasonable as 
the number of damaged components is small and there is ample time to mobilize the 
necessary crews and machinery while awaiting arrival of the spares to commence repairs.   
All test-cases are configured in GAMS to solve with a 1% relative optimality gap, 
or until the solver time reaches one hour, whichever occurs earlier.  Table 4 presents the 
results.   
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4 0.0 579 194 1.5 4 
8 0.0 1,314 544 4.1 9 
12 0.0 1,648 846 6.4 11 
16 0.8 2,293 1,329 10.0 13 
20 0.9 3,865 2,425 18.2 13 
Table 4. Impact of five different levels of damage on the grid due to a terrorist attack.  
Maximum power shed indicates load shedding immediately after the terrorist 
attack and assumes that the undamaged portion of the grid is stabilized and 
operational.  Energy shed measures cumulative load lost until system repair is 
complete. 
The number of grid components that are damaged in the terrorist-attack scenario 
is a fraction of that assumed in our hurricane-damage scenario.  Not surprisingly, the 
maximum power shed is also significantly lower at about 20% to 30% of the level due to 
hurricane damage.  However, the impact of the terrorist attack in terms of energy shed 
(and therefore, economic cost) is much greater due to the prolonged recovery period.  In 
these scenarios, the economic impact of a terrorist attack that damages just eight critical 
components exceeds that from a large storm that causes damage to eight percent of the 
grid.  If the spares were delivered over a longer timeframe, measured in months rather 
than weeks, the economic consequences would be even larger.  This highlights the 
potential impact of spares availability on grid recovery and underscores the need to keep 
a strategic inventory of critical components to facilitate quick restoration of the power 
grid.  To this end, RECOP can be used as a tool to help evaluate the effectiveness of 
various mixes of inventories. 
D. RECOP SOLUTION SPEED AND QUALITY 
To obtain a good initial, upper bound to RECOP when solved directly with the 
MIP, we set its initial feasible integer solution using results from the heuristic solution 
procedure described in Section E.   Tables 5 and 6 present the solution times and 
optimality gaps for out test cases. 
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Percentage of components 





4% (28) 1.0 230 










Table 5. RECOP optimality gaps and solution times for the hurricane-damage 
scenarios. 






4      0.0 5 
8      0.0 10 
12      0.0 120 
16      0.8 340 
20      0.9 480 
Table 6. RECOP optimality gaps and solution times for the terrorist-attack scenarios. 
Note that for the terrorist-attack scenarios, which have relatively few binary 
decision variables, optimal or near-optimal solutions are obtained within 480 seconds.  
The NP-hard nature of RECOP becomes apparent in the hurricane-damage scenarios, 
where the optimality gap remains at 6.1% after two hours of solver time for the largest 
test-case with 20% of network components damaged. 
In the following sections, we present two alternative methods to solving RECOP, 
at least approximately, and compare the solutions obtained using these methods to those 
obtained by solving the MIP directly. 
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E. HEURISTIC SOLUTION 
After some manipulation, RECOP can be stated in standard form as:  
x,y
  RECOP: min
                 s.t.      
                      










where y represents generation outputs, load-shedding, power flows and phase angles 
(original , ,  and g s y θ− variables, respectively), and where x represents bus- and line-
repair variables (original , ,  and n nx x q q variables, respectively.)   
We can solve RECOP heuristically in a two-stage process.  Firstly, we formulate 
and solve the following Heuristic sub-model-1 (H1-RECOP): 
x







where f represents heuristic weights for the relative importance of repairing each of the 
damaged buses and lines in the grid.  For buses, we assign weights equal to the bus’s 
local generation capacity plus the capacity of all its incident lines.  Lines are assigned 
weights equal to their capacities.  We then solve H1-RECOP to obtain xˆ . 
Stage two of the heuristic simply solves: 
y









H2-RECOP therefore obtains the minimum-cost, feasible power flow based on 
the recovery plan given by xˆ . 
The heuristic solution procedure for RECOP is implemented in GAMS and solved 
using CPLEX.  For all test cases, in both scenarios, feasible solutions are obtained within 
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10 seconds.  We compare the quality of these solutions to those from the MIP 
formulation in Section G.    
F.  BENDERS DECOMPOSITION OF RECOP 
RECOP has a bi-level structure that makes the model suitable for the application 
of Benders decomposition [Benders 1962]; this is a well-known technique for solving 
MIPs.  The first level specifies the damage inflicted on the network, which is modeled 
through binary decision variables.  The second level is a continuous network-flow model 
that determines the electrical power-flow through the damaged network.  Since the 
second-level, continuous model is linear, it satisfies Benders’ requirement for convexity 
in the subproblem.   
Using the notation from the previous section, the subproblem (SP) for the 
Benders-decomposition implementation of RECOP may be written as: 
y
1
ˆSP ( ): min [dual variables]
ˆ              s.t.  [ ]









where 1kπ +  represents the dual variables of the corresponding constraints and k represents 
the iteration counter of the Benders Decomposition Algorithm (BDA), which is presented 
in Appendix D.  We solve SP to obtain 1ˆkπ + , the optimal values for 1kπ + .  The first 
iteration of BDA uses xˆ  obtained from H1-RECOP as input, in order to provide a good 
initial upper bound on the optimal objective value for the full problem. 
 The “master problem” (MP) for the Benders decomposition takes the form: 
x,z
MP : min
ˆ         s.t. ( ) 1,2,...,









π′≥− + − =
≤  
where i indexes the constraints at a given iteration of BDA. 
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Figure 3 shows the sequence of lower and upper bounds (LB and UB, 
respectively) generated by BDA for the terrorist-attack scenario with eight components 
damaged.  Convergence is rapid (21 iterations, 40 seconds), and the optimal recovery 
plan produced by BDA matches that produced by solving RECOP directly using the MIP.  
Figure 4 shows the bounds for the hurricane-damage scenario with 8% of components 
damaged.  Solution time is one hour with 631 iterations.   For our largest test case with 
20% of components damaged, convergence is slow and a significant optimality gap of 


















Figure 3.   Convergence of BDA upper and lower bounds for terrorist-attack scenario 
with eight components damaged.  Solution time is 40 seconds with 21 
iterations.  Initial lower-bounds are negative and have been truncated from 





















Figure 4.   Convergence of BDA upper and lower bounds for hurricane-damage scenario 
with 8% of grid components damaged.  Solution time is one hour with 631 
iterations.   Initial lower-bounds are negative and have been truncated from 


















Figure 5.   Convergence of BDA upper and lower bounds for hurricane-damage scenario 
with 20% of grid components damaged.  Solution time is one hour with 311 
iterations.  Initial lower-bounds are negative and have been truncated from 
the chart for clarity.   
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G.  COMPARISON OF SOLUTION METHODS AND TIMES 
This section compares the energy shed over the repair horizon, i.e., solution 
quality, and solution times, for solutions obtained for RECOP through the MIP, Benders 
decomposition and the heuristic.  Figures 6 and 7 present the results for the hurricane-
damage and terrorist-attack scenarios, respectively.   
Hurricane-Damage Scenario























MIP 174 417 674 999 1384
Benders 176 426 710 1128 1513
Heuristics 184 466 795 1196 1569








230 seconds 950 seconds 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour
1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour
10 seconds 10 seconds 10 seconds 10 seconds 10 seconds
 
Figure 6.   Energy shed and solution times for the hurricane-damage scenarios solved 
using MIP, Benders decomposition and a heuristic.  Percentages along the 
horizontal axis indicate the proportion of grid components damaged. 
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Terrorist-Attack Scenario




















MIP 194 544 846 1328 2425
Benders 194 544 846 1373 2502
Heuristics 194 749 1049 1651 2810








5 seconds 10 seconds 120 seconds 340 seconds 480 seconds
10 seconds 40 seconds 640 seconds 1 hour 1 hour
10 seconds 10 seconds 10 seconds 10 seconds  10 seconds
 
Figure 7.   Energy shed and solution times for the terrorist-attack scenarios solved using 
MIP, Benders decomposition and a heuristic.  Numbers along the horizontal 
axis indicate the number of grid components damaged. 
It is apparent from Figures 6 and 7 that solving the MIP directly yields the best 
solution quality for both scenarios.  Benders decomposition does not fare as well, taking 
at least as much time as the MIP to produce a solution of the same or inferior quality.  
Approximately solving RECOP by the heuristic fares worst in terms of solution quality.  
However, the heuristic achieves a good feasible solution quickly:  In the hurricane-
damage scenarios, heuristic solutions obtained in ten seconds are within 10% of that 
obtained by solving the MIP directly for an hour.  The gap between the heuristic and MIP 
solution methods widens to a maximum of 40% in the terrorist-attack scenarios, where 
relatively few components are damaged.  In these cases, the problem is small enough to 
be solved efficiently by the MIP.  But, given an electrical grid that has thousands of 
buses, instead of the 300 in our test network, the heuristic solution procedure may be the 
most viable option in practice.   
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has formulated and solved a mixed-integer RECovery OPtimization  
program (RECOP) to plan the recovery of an electrical power grid that has been damaged 
by a natural disaster or terrorist attack.  The recovery plan takes into account the 
availability of repair resources and spares, and schedules the allocation of both in order to 
minimize the amount of unmet demand for energy over the planning horizon.   
We implement RECOP in GAMS and use CPLEX as the solver.  An electrical 
grid based on IEEE’s 300-bus transmission network is used for testing.  To simulate 
varying degrees of damage to the network, we choose up to 20% of the grid’s buses, lines 
and transformers to be placed out of service.  We demonstrate that RECOP can produce a 
recovery plan to minimize power-shedding costs that is within 7% of optimal within an 
hour.  This result is obtained on a 2 GHz personal computer with 1 GB of RAM.  
Additionally, we explore using a heuristic and Benders decomposition to solve 
RECOP, at least approximately.  In all test cases, Benders decomposition takes at least as 
much time as the MIP requires to produce a solution of the same or inferior quality.  For 
the terrorist-attack scenarios, where relatively few components are damaged, the heuristic 
solutions are up to 40% worse in terms of energy shed compared to the MIP solutions.  
The difference in performance between these two solution methods narrows in hurricane-
damage scenarios, however, where more components are damaged.  In these cases, each 
heuristic solution obtained in ten seconds is within 10% of the solution obtained by 
solving the MIP, given a one-hour time limit.  This shows the potential of the heuristic 
solution method for larger-sized problems to obtain “reasonable” solutions within a short 
period of time.  However, more computational trials using randomized sets of damaged 
buses and lines are required to understand the impact of input data on the variability of 
RECOP run times and the quality of heuristic solutions. 
We demonstrate that, although the number of grid components that might be 
damaged in a coordinated terrorist attack may be relatively small compared to the number 
damaged by a hurricane, the impact in terms of energy shed and economic costs could be 
larger.  This is true because terrorists can selectively target critical components that 
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cannot be replaced immediately due to delivery and manufacturing lead-times for 
replacement parts.  This point highlights the potential impact of spares availability on 
grid recovery and underscores the need to keep a strategic inventory of critical 
components to facilitate quick restoration of the power grid.  To this end, RECOP can be 
used as a tool to help evaluate the effectiveness of various mixes of inventories. 
Areas for further research include: 
1. Refining the Benders decomposition algorithm to improve its 
computational speed and quality. 
2.  Developing more advanced heuristics to improve solution quality.  This 
may include determining better weights to prioritize the recovery of damaged 
components, and an iterative solution approach to repeatedly refine the recovery plan 
based on previous solutions. 
3. Incorporating alternative objective functions in RECOP.  Currently, the 
aim is to minimize the cost of energy shed over the recovery time-horizon.  Other 
plausible objectives could be to minimize the recovery time or to ensure that, for 
example, 90% of affected customers have their power restored within a certain period of 
time.  Additionally, if a base load of critical users exist, the model could be modified to 
plan the recovery process such that these users have their power restored first, before the 
scope of the recovery work is expanded to other affected parts of the grid.    
4. Testing on real-world problems. 
5. Extending the basic methodology to recovery-planning for other critical 
infrastructure systems (e.g., a road network following an earthquake.) 
6. Extending the model to incorporate dependencies between infrastructures.  
For example, if both a road network and a power grid in an area are damaged, repairs to 
certain damaged components of the grid may not be able to commence until road access 
to these components is restored. 
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APPENDIX A.  IEEE 300-BUS NETWORK GENERATION 
CAPACITY 
The table below lists the changes made to the generation capacities at some of the 
buses of the IEEE [1993] 300-bus network. 




37 0 500 
41 0 300 
51 5 150 
108 117 150 
126 0 500 
128 0 800 
130 0 1,000 
143 696 1,000 
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APPENDIX B.  DATA FOR HURRICANE-DAMAGE SCENARIOS 
A. REPAIR-RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
Ten units each of r1, r2 and r3 are introduced into the pool of available repair-
resources at the start of the first, fourth and eighth time-periods, respectively. 
B. LIST OF DAMAGED BUSES AND LINES AND REPAIR PRECEDANCE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Scenario with 4% of Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 17, 62, 69, 77, 79, 80 and 130. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 8), (4, 16), (5, 9), (7, 131), (8, 11), (8, 14), 
(9, 11), (14, 15), (15, 16), (15, 17), (16, 42), (89, 91), (90, 92) and (92, 103).  
Pairs of damaged buses [i, i'] where bus i must be repaired before starting repair 
on bus i': [1, 2], [2, 3] and [3, 4]. 
Pairs of damaged lines [(i, j), (i', j')] where line (i, j) must be repaired before 
starting repair on line (i', j'): [(1, 5), (2, 3)], [(2, 3), (2, 8)] and [(2, 8), (4, 16)]. 
2. Scenario with 8% of Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 62, 69, 77, 79, 80, 125, 126, 
130, 144, 151, 158, 167 and 170. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 8), (3, 19), (4, 16), (5, 9), (7, 131), (8, 11), 
(8, 14), (9, 11), (10, 11), (14, 15), (15, 16), (15, 17), (15, 37), (16, 42), (40, 48), (49, 51), 
(89, 91), (90, 92), (91, 94), (91, 97), (92, 103), (92, 105), (123, 124), (126, 157), (126, 
158), (126, 169), (127, 168), (129, 130), (130, 132), (130, 168) and (158, 160). 
Pairs of damaged buses [i, i'] where bus i must be repaired before starting repair 
on bus i': [1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [4,7], [20, 21] and [22, 125]. 
Pairs of damaged lines [(i, j), (i', j')] where line (i, j) must be repaired before 
starting repair on line (i', j'): [(1, 5), (2, 3)], [(2, 3), (2, 8)], [(2, 8), (4, 16)], [(2, 3), (3, 
19)], [(3, 19), (4, 16)] and [(3, 19), (15, 37)]. 
3. Scenario with 12% of Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 34, 35, 62, 69, 77, 79, 
80, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 134, 135, 144, 151, 158, 167, 170, 190, 193 and 197. 
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Damaged lines (i, j): (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 8), (3, 19), (4, 16), (5, 9),  (7, 131), (8, 11), 
(8, 14), (9, 11), (10, 11), (14, 15), (15, 16), (15, 17), (15, 37), (16, 42), (40, 48), (47, 113), 
(48, 107), (49, 51), (89, 91), (90, 92), (91, 94), (91, 97), (92, 103), (92, 105), (122, 125), 
(122, 157), (123, 124), (126, 127), (126, 157), (126, 158), (126, 169), (127, 134), (127, 
168), (128, 133), (129, 130), (130, 132), (130, 168), (133, 137), (135, 136), (154, 156), 
(155, 161), (157, 159), (158, 160), (163, 164), (167, 169), (194, 219) and (195, 219). 
Pairs of damaged buses [i, i'] where bus i must be repaired before starting repair 
on bus i': [1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [4,7], [19, 20], [20, 21], [21, 22.], [125, 126] and [126, 
130]. 
Pairs of damaged lines [(i, j), (i', j')] where line (i, j) must be repaired before 
starting repair on line (i', j'): [(1, 5), (2, 3)], [(2, 3), (2, 8)], [(2, 8), (4, 16)], [(2, 3), (3, 
19)], [(3, 19), (4, 16)], [(3, 19), (15, 37)], [(15, 37), (40, 48)], [(133, 137), (154, 156)] and 
[(133, 137), (155, 161)]. 
4. Scenario with 16% of Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 34, 35, 62, 69, 77, 
79, 80, 97, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 144, 151, 158, 167, 170, 
172, 173, 174, 181, 182, 186, 187, 190, 193 and 197. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 8), (3, 19), (4, 16), (5, 9), (7, 131), (8, 11), 
(8, 14), (9, 11), (10, 11), (14, 15), (15, 16), (15, 17), (15, 37), (16, 42), (40, 48), (45, 74), 
(47, 113), (48, 107), (49, 51), (89, 91), (90, 92), (91, 94), (91, 97), (92, 103), (92, 105), 
(122, 125), (122, 123), (122, 157), (123, 124), (126, 127), (126, 157), (126, 158), (126, 
169), (127, 134), (127, 168), (128, 133), (129, 130), (130, 132), (130, 168), (133, 137), 
(134, 135), (135, 136), (136, 137), (136, 152), (145, 146), (145, 149), (152, 153), (154, 
156), (154, 183), (155, 161), (157, 159), (158, 160), (162, 164), (162, 165), (163, 164), 
(165, 166), (167, 169), (184, 185), (190, 231), (194, 219), (195, 212), (195, 219), (197, 
198) and (197, 211). 
Pairs of damaged buses [i, i'] where bus i must be repaired before starting repair 
on bus i': [1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [4,7], [19, 20], [20, 21], [125, 126], [126, 130], [134, 135], 
[135, 136], [136, 137] and [190, 193]. 
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Pairs of damaged lines [(i, j), (i', j')] where line (i, j) must be repaired before 
starting repair on line (i', j'): [(1, 5), (2, 3)], [(2, 3), (2, 8)], [(2, 8), (4, 16)], [(2, 3), (3, 
19)], [(3, 19), (4, 16)], [(3, 19), (15, 37)], [(15, 37), (40, 48)], [(133, 137), (154, 156)], 
[(133, 137), (155, 161)], [(145, 146), (154, 156)], [(154, 156), (157, 159)], [(154, 156), 
(165, 166)] and [(190, 231), (194, 219)]. 
5. Scenario with 20% of Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 34, 35, 62, 69, 77, 
79, 80, 97, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 144, 151, 158, 167, 170, 
172, 173, 174, 181, 182, 186, 187, 190, 193, 197, 198, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 209, 211, 
212, 222, 236 and 241. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (1, 5), (2, 3), (2, 8), (3, 19), (4, 16), (5, 9), (7, 131), (8, 11), 
(8, 14), (9, 11), (10, 11), (14, 15), (15, 16), (15, 17), (15, 37), (16, 42), (40, 48), (45, 74), 
(47, 113), (48, 107), (49, 51), (89, 91), (90, 92), (91, 94), (91, 97), (92, 103), (122, 123),  
(122, 125), (122, 157), (123, 124), (126, 127), (126, 157), (126, 158), (126, 169), (127, 
134), (127, 168), (128, 133), (129, 130), (130, 132), (130, 168), (133, 137), (134, 135), 
(135, 136), (136, 137), (136, 152), (145, 146), (145, 149), (152, 153), (154, 156), (154, 
183), (155, 161), (157, 159), (158, 160), (162, 164), (162, 165), (163, 164), (165, 166), 
(167, 169), (184, 185), (190, 231), (194, 219), (195, 212), (195, 219), (197, 198), (197, 
211), (198, 203), (201, 204), (203, 211), (204, 205), (206, 207), (206, 208), (212, 215), 
(213, 214), (214, 215), (216, 217), (219, 237), (220, 221), (242, 245), (242, 247), (244, 
246) and (245, 247). 
Pairs of damaged buses [i, i'] where bus i must be repaired before starting repair 
on bus i': [1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], [4,7], [13, 17], [19, 20], [20, 21], [22, 125], [123, 124], 
[125, 126], [126, 130], [134, 135], [135, 136], [172, 173] and [172, 174]. 
Pairs of damaged lines [(i, j), (i', j')] where line (i, j) must be repaired before 
starting repair on line (i', j'): [(1, 5), (2, 3)], [(1, 5), (133, 137)], [(2, 3), (2, 8)], [(2, 8), (4, 
16)], [(2, 3), (3, 19)], [(3, 19), (15, 37)], [(4, 16), (5, 9)], [(15, 37), (40, 48)], [(133, 137), 
(135, 136)], [(133, 137), (154, 156)], [(145, 146), (154, 156)], [(154, 156), (157, 159)], 
[(162, 164), (162, 165)], [(162, 164), (163, 164)] and [(190, 231), (194, 219)]. 
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C. BUS REPAIR-RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND REPAIR TIMES 
 The table below shows the respective number of units of repair-resource r1, r2 or 
r3 required to repair each damaged bus, if that resource type is utilized for the repair, and 
the corresponding repair times.  
 
Number of units of r1, r2 and r3 
required for repair, if r1, r2 or 
r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Bus 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
1 1 2 3 3 2 1 
2 1 2 3 3 2 1 
3 1 2 3 3 2 1 
4 1 2 3 3 2 1 
5 1 2 3 3 2 1 
6 1 2 3 3 2 1 
7 1 2 3 3 2 1 
9 1 2 3 3 2 1 
13 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 
21 3 1 2 2 1 3 
22 3 1 2 2 1 3 
27 3 1 2 2 1 3 
34 3 1 2 2 1 3 
35 3 1 2 2 1 3 
62 1 2 3 3 2 1 
69 1 2 3 3 2 1 
77 1 1 1 1 1 1 
79 1 1 1 1 1 1 
80 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Number of units of r1, r2 and r3 
required for repair, if r1, r2 or 
r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Bus 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
97 3 1 2 2 1 3 
123 1 2 3 3 2 1 
124 1 2 3 3 2 1 
125 1 2 3 3 2 1 
126 1 2 3 3 2 1 
130 1 1 1 1 1 1 
133 1 1 1 1 1 1 
134 1 1 1 1 1 1 
135 1 1 1 1 1 1 
136 1 1 1 1 1 1 
137 3 1 2 2 1 3 
144 3 1 2 2 1 3 
151 3 1 2 2 1 3 
158 3 1 2 2 1 3 
167 1 2 3 3 2 1 
170 1 2 3 3 2 1 
172 1 2 3 3 2 1 
173 1 2 3 3 2 1 
174 1 2 3 3 2 1 
181 1 1 1 1 1 1 
182 1 1 1 1 1 1 
186 3 1 2 2 1 3 
187 3 1 2 2 1 3 
190 3 1 2 2 1 3 
193 3 1 2 2 1 3 
197 3 1 2 2 1 3 
198 3 1 2 2 1 3 
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Number of units of r1, r2 and r3 
required for repair, if r1, r2 or 
r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Bus 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
201 3 1 2 2 1 3 
202 3 1 2 2 1 3 
204 3 1 2 2 1 3 
206 3 1 2 2 1 3 
207 3 1 2 2 1 3 
209 3 1 2 2 1 3 
211 3 1 2 2 1 3 
212 3 1 2 2 1 3 
222 1 2 3 3 2 1 
236 3 1 2 2 1 3 
241 3 1 2 2 1 3 
 
D. LINE REPAIR-RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND REPAIR TIMES 
The table below shows the respective number of units of repair-resource r1, r2 or 
r3 required to repair each damaged line, if that resource type is utilized for the repair, and 
the corresponding repair times. 
 
Number of units of r1, r2 and 
r3 required for repair, if r1, r2 
or r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Line 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
1, 5 3 2 1 1 2 3 
2, 3 3 2 1 1 2 3 
2, 8 3 2 1 1 2 3 
3, 19 1 1 1 1 2 3 
4, 16 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5, 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Number of units of r1, r2 and 
r3 required for repair, if r1, r2 
or r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Line 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
7, 131 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8, 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8, 14 2 1 3 1 1 1 
9, 11 2 1 3 3 1 2 
10, 11 2 1 3 3 1 2 
14, 15 2 1 3 3 1 2 
15, 16 2 1 3 3 1 2 
15, 17 2 1 3 3 1 2 
15, 37 2 1 3 3 1 2 
16, 42 2 1 3 3 1 2 
40, 48 3 2 1 1 2 3 
45, 74 1 1 1 1 1 1 
47, 113 1 1 1 1 1 1 
48, 107 2 1 3 1 1 1 
49, 51 2 1 3 3 1 2 
89, 91 3 2 1 1 2 3 
90, 92 3 2 1 1 2 3 
91, 94 3 2 1 1 2 3 
91, 97 3 2 1 1 2 3 
92, 103 3 2 1 1 2 3 
122, 123 2 1 3 3 1 2 
122, 125 2 1 3 3 1 2 
122, 157 2 1 3 3 1 2 
123, 124 2 1 3 3 1 2 
126, 127 2 1 3 3 1 2 
126, 157 2 1 3 3 1 2 
126, 158 2 1 3 3 1 2 
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Number of units of r1, r2 and 
r3 required for repair, if r1, r2 
or r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Line 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
126, 169 2 1 3 3 1 2 
127, 134 2 1 3 3 1 2 
127, 168 2 1 3 3 1 2 
128, 133 2 1 3 3 1 2 
129, 130 2 1 3 3 1 2 
130, 132 2 1 3 3 1 2 
130, 168 3 2 1 1 2 3 
133, 137 3 2 1 1 2 3 
134, 135 3 2 1 1 2 3 
134, 184 1 1 1 1 2 3 
135, 136 1 1 1 1 1 1 
136, 137 1 1 1 1 1 1 
136, 152 1 1 1 1 1 1 
145, 146 2 1 3 3 1 2 
145, 149 2 1 3 3 1 2 
152, 153 2 1 3 3 1 2 
154, 156 2 1 3 3 1 2 
154, 183 2 1 3 3 1 2 
155, 161 2 1 3 3 1 2 
155, 164 2 1 3 3 1 2 
157, 159 2 1 3 3 1 2 
158, 159 2 1 3 3 1 2 
158, 160 2 1 3 3 1 2 
162, 164 2 1 3 3 1 2 
162, 165 2 1 3 3 1 2 
163, 164 2 1 3 3 1 2 
165, 166 2 1 3 3 1 2 
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Number of units of r1, r2 and 
r3 required for repair, if r1, r2 
or r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Line 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
167, 169 2 1 3 3 1 2 
184, 185 3 2 1 1 2 3 
190, 231 1 1 1 1 2 3 
194, 219 1 1 1 1 1 1 
195, 212 2 1 3 1 1 1 
195, 219 2 1 3 3 1 2 
197, 198 2 1 3 3 1 2 
197, 211 2 1 3 3 1 2 
198, 203 2 1 3 3 1 2 
201, 204 2 1 3 3 1 2 
203, 211 2 1 3 3 1 2 
204, 205 2 1 3 3 1 2 
206, 207 2 1 3 3 1 2 
206, 208 2 1 3 3 1 2 
212, 215 2 1 3 3 1 2 
213, 214 2 1 3 3 1 2 
214, 215 2 1 3 3 1 2 
216, 217 2 1 3 3 1 2 
219, 237 2 1 3 3 1 2 
220, 221 2 1 3 3 1 2 
242, 245 3 2 1 1 2 3 
242, 247 1 1 1 1 2 3 
244, 246 1 1 1 1 1 1 




















APPENDIX C.  DATA FOR TERRORIST-ATTACK SCENARIOS 
A. REPAIR-RESOURCE AVAILABILITY 
Six units of r1 and five units of r2 are introduced into the pool of available repair-
resources at the start of the first time-period, and six units of r3 are introduced during the 
start of the second period. 
B. LIST OF DAMAGED BUSES AND LINES  
1. Scenario with 4 Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 5 and 11. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (6, 7), and (10, 11).  
2. Scenario with 8 Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 5, 11, 17 and 37. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (3, 4), (6, 7), (10, 11) and (23, 24). 
3. Scenario with 12 Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 5, 11, 17, 37, 84 and 92. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (3, 4), (6, 7), (10, 11), (23, 24), (35, 36) and (45, 46). 
4. Scenario with 16 Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 5, 11, 17, 37, 84, 92, 108 and 124. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (3, 4), (6, 7), (10, 11), (23, 24), (35, 36), (45, 46), (81, 88) 
and (85, 99). 
5. Scenario with 20 Components Damaged 
Damaged buses: 5, 11, 17, 37, 84, 92, 108, 124, 143 and 152. 
Damaged lines (i, j): (3, 4), (6, 7), (10, 11), (23, 24), (35, 36), (45, 46), (81, 88), 
(85, 99), (117, 159) and (133, 171). 
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C. BUS REPAIR-RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND REPAIR TIMES 
 The table below shows the respective number of units of repair-resource r1, r2 or 
r3 required to repair each damaged bus, if that resource type is utilized for the repair, and 
the corresponding repair times.  
 
Number of units of r1, r2 and r3 
required for repair, if r1, r2 or 
r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Bus 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
5 1 2 3 3 2 1 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 
37 3 1 2 2 1 3 
84 3 1 2 2 1 3 
92 3 1 2 2 1 3 
108 3 1 2 2 1 3 
124 1 2 3 3 2 1 
143 3 1 2 2 1 3 
152 3 1 2 2 1 3 
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D. LINE REPAIR-RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND REPAIR TIMES 
The table below shows the respective number of units of repair-resource r1, r2 or 
r3 required to repair each damaged line, if that resource type is utilized for the repair, and 
the corresponding repair times. 
 
Number of units of r1, r2 and 
r3 required for repair, if r1, r2 
or r3 are selected, respectively 
Repair time if using r1, r2 or r3 
for repair (days) 
Line 
r1 r2 r3 r1 r2 r3 
3, 4 1 2 3 3 2 1 
6, 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10, 11 3 1 2 2 1 3 
23, 24 3 1 2 2 1 3 
35, 36 3 1 2 2 1 3 
45, 46 1 1 1 1 1 1 
81, 88 3 1 2 2 1 3 
85, 99 3 1 2 2 1 3 
117, 159 3 1 2 2 1 3 
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APPENDIX D.  BENDERS DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM 
This section describes the Benders Decomposition Algorithm for solving RECOP.  
(The notation ( )ϑ ⋅  refers to the optimal objective-function value of the problem in the 
argument.)  We use a modified form of Benders decomposition where we solve the 
relaxed master problem (RMP) in most iterations k, and solve the true master problem 
only once out of every ten iterations.  As RMP solves much faster than MP, and the cuts 
derived from RMP are valid, this technique improves the convergence rate of the lower-
bound.  The algorithm follows. 
Input: Initial solution 0xˆ  obtained from HS-RECOP, matrices B and C, vectors c, 
c' and d, and an optimality tolerance 0ε > . 
Output: Recovery plan, *x  and associated power flows, generation levels, phase 
angles, and load shedding, jointly denoted as y*. 
1.  Set the iteration counter k := 0, the lower bound (LB) := −∞ , and the upper 
bound (UB) := +∞ . 
2.  Solve ˆ(SP ( ))k kx  for ˆky  and 1ˆkπ + .   
3.  If k is a multiple of 10, let UBk := ˆ ˆkc x cy′− + .  If UB UBk ≤ , then update the 
upper bound: UB := UBk , and set 
*x := ˆkx . 
4.  If UB LB  ε− ≤ , STOP; otherwise, continue to step 5. 
5.  Add the newly generated cut to 1(MP )k+ : 1 1 1ˆ ( )k k kz c x d Bxπ+ + +′≥− + − . 
6.  Set k := k + 1. 
7.  If k is a multiple of 10, solve (MPk) for ˆkx  and set ˆ : (MP )k kz ϑ= ; otherwise, 
solve the relaxed master problem (RMPk) for ˆkx  and set ˆ : (RMP )k kz ϑ= . 
8.  If ˆkz ≥ LB, set ˆLB :  kz= . 
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